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This paper examines the ways in which sufferers talk or write about early stroke and the 
effects this chronic condition has on identity.  Traditional research into chronic illness 
has largely used medical, psychiatric or cognitive models.  We adopt a social 
constructionist perspective and use a discourse analytic methodology to study data 
collected via computer-mediated email communication, and focus group interaction.  
Participants showed sensitivity about a potentially „damaged‟ sense of self by 
highlighting positive features of their experiences, and attended to the issue of whether 
their accounts were persuasive or believable.  In focus group discussions, some carers 
were present.  Although there were some similarities between focus group and email 
participants, there were some differences.  Principally, focus group participants did not 
produce highly positive evaluations of their experience.  Moreover, they displayed 
sensitivity to the way that carers might respond to mitigation of the negative aspects of 
stroke.  
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Our aim is to examine the construction of identity and change in identity, and to show 
how identity constructions are sensitive to interpersonal issues in different interactional 
contexts.  Participants are relatively young stroke sufferers (aged 55 or less). 
 
Stroke is debilitating and prevalent.  In 2006, the estimated number of stroke patients 
seen in General Practice in Scotland was approximately 53,000 people - 1% of the 
population (ISD, 2007).  Approximately 10% of stroke sufferers in Scotland are under 
the age of 55 (ISD, 2007).   The initial stage can involve anything from mild confusion 
to complete loss of consciousness for a number of days.  As many as 35-40% die within 
the first month; those who survive may be left with moderate to severe neurological 
impairments that can affect speech, sight, movement and memory.  For many, stroke 
also results in overwhelming fatigue and/or depression.   
 
There is very little in the way of pharmacological or surgical treatment for stroke.  The 
emphasis instead is on rehabilitation, aimed at enabling the patient to relearn the 
practical skills necessary to prevent physical degeneration - such as that caused by 
restricted movement - and to regain functional competence through repetitive exercise.  
The stroke literature, too, is dominated by a concern with identifying and measuring 
indicators of physical abilities (Pound, Gompertz, & Ebrahim, 1977).  This approach 
has been criticised because it can fail to take into account the psychological and 
emotional effects of this condition (White & Johnstone, 2000).  Moreover, the emphasis 
on physical rehabilitation may not match the concerns of the patient.  Kaufman & 
Becker (1986), for example, found that as well as losing functional independence, 
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stroke sufferers missed their former ease of movement, energy and sense of wholeness.  
They noted that medical practitioners' preoccupation with the observation and 
measurement of rehabilitative tasks was shared by sufferers only in the first few months 
post-stroke.  Thereafter, stroke sufferers co-operated, but were not 'engaged', their main 
interest having moved to recovery, "a non-specific, diffuse goal which implies notions 
of normality, continuity and identity" (Kaufman & Becker, 1986: 83).  Kaufman  
reports that sufferers “believe that they are physically, emotionally, or cognitively 
different from their former selves, in spite of "perfect" performance in therapy” 
(Kaufman, 1988: 86).  Similarly, in a phenomenological study, Burton (2000) writes 
that participants focused on engagement in the social world rather than physical 
performance.  Ellis-Hill (1998) found that two years after their stroke, participants saw 
themselves as less active, satisfied, independent or interested than they had been pre-
stroke.  These perceptions did not appear to be related solely to the severity of the 
physical symptoms.  Thus, the observable level of physical impairment is not a reliable 
indicator of the stroke sufferer's experience of illness.   
 
Other research suggests that sufferers experience a major disruption in their lives.  Thus 
Ellis-Hill and her colleagues found in their study that "[a]ll of the respondents described 
their lives as having undergone a change that could be likened to entering a new foreign 
world" (Ellis-Hill, Payne, & Ward, 2000:727).   Similar findings are reported by Becker 
(1993) in a study in which 100 people were interviewed up to one year post-stroke.  
Glass and Maddox (1992) describe the post-stroke experience as a psychosocial 
transition in which the effect of sudden change is to cast doubt on the sufferer's previous 
assumptions about the world and how he or she is to live in it.  Stroke can also bring 
about feelings of uncertainty as to the future (Bendz, 2000). 
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A central theme here appears to be a change in identity, and consequently a need to 
rethink the self in interactions with others.  Thus, Kirkevold (2002) argues that sufferers 
may be more concerned about their changed roles and relationships than recovery of 
physical function (Banks & Pearson, 2004).  In addition, the fact that the responsibility 
for rehabilitation is on the patient rather than the clinician can be particularly 
problematic for sufferers, who can be held accountable by carers for their recovery.  
This can affect the sufferer's identity (Kaufman, 1988; Pound, Gompertz, & Ebrahim, 
1998).  Stroke sufferers who experience aphasia may find that this affects their 
interactions with others, and that successful adaptation may involve a renegotiation of 
identity (Shadden 2005; Shadden & Agan, 2004).  Higher quality of life post-stroke has 
been reported for people who prioritised activities they felt to be particularly salient to 
their identity (Clarke & Black, 2005).  Parry (2004) shows that identity is an issue even 
when the focus is on physical rehabilitation. She showed, for example, that 
physiotherapists were sensitive to the negative identity-related consequences of physical 
incompetence and tried to avoid this in their interactions. 
 
However, there are few, if any, studies of how young stroke sufferers negotiate their 
own identities, how they account for change in self, and how they attend to related 
interpersonal issues in accounting for self.  In this study we therefore examine sufferers‟ 
accounts given in two different interactional contexts: one-to-one email correspondence 
with the first author, and focus groups in which other early-onset stroke sufferers were 
present, as well as carers.  We adopt an approach - discourse analysis – that is well-
suited to examining constructions of identity, how particular constructions are achieved 
through the language used (including linguistic devices), and how identity constructions 
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have an action-orientation, that is, they have particular effects which it is the analysts‟ 
job to identify (e.g. to do with accountability, blame).  Discourse analysis involves a 
detailed analysis of the interaction within and through which identity work is done, as 
well as identifying why a particular identity or meaning is invoked on this occasion.  
However, Hutchby and Wooffitt
 
(1998) note that speakers‟ utterances may be designed 
to respond not simply to the interviewer, but to the wider community.  Thus, 
explanations or excuses are provided in a social context in which the function of 
utterances is understood because there is a level of shared social understanding.  When 
they speak, participants draw on culturally available resources, and we can assume that 
these resources are not employed exclusively in the context of interviews but have a 
currency beyond that setting.  We can also assume that the discursive resources found in 
these data are not specific to this community of speakers.  Discourse analysis, then, 
affords a deeper understanding of socially available descriptions of stroke and identity. 
 
Previously, discursive analysis has been used successfully to elucidate the interactional 
consequences of stroke by examining conversational exchanges between health 
professionals and stroke sufferers (Martinovski, Traum, & Marsella, 2007).  Using a 
related technique - conversation analysis - Horton (2007) examined the way in which 
therapists control topic generation in conversations with aphasic patients and how this is 
used to establish a particular therapeutic identity for themselves and a „patient‟ identity 
for their clients.  Other researchers (Grainger, Masterton, & Jennings, 2005) have relied 
upon conversation analysis to tease apart the interactional subtleties of conversational 
episodes between therapist and client in which the therapist talks about the difficulties 
and problems which the client will face as a result of experiencing a stroke.   
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However, few studies have used discursive analysis to explore questions of illness and 
identity.  Where studies of this sort have been carried out (Bowker & Tuffin, 2004; 
Giles, 2006; Guise, Widdicombe & McKinlay, ), this has been in relation to conditions 
other than stroke.  This is despite the fact that questions of identity in general have been 
a topic of long-standing interest in the area of discursive research (Benwell & Stokoe, 
2006).  The present paper addresses this current lack by focusing directly on issues of 




Participants were recruited via support groups for people who had suffered stroke at a 
young age (defined as aged 55 or less).  There can be practical problems in arranging 
face-to-face interactions with people who suffer chronic illness.  They may, for 
example, have problems of mobility, or difficulties in producing speech.  People were 
also recruited via a web-based support group.  This ran as a message board, and 
provided the means to initiate one-to-one email contact with sufferers willing to 
participate.  All respondents were given assurances of confidentiality and contact details 
in case they wished to withdraw at a later stage (none did).  All personal and place 
names were changed.  Where hospitals were named, this was replaced by a numerical 
code.  Some stroke sufferers were accompanied by a carer, and these people also joined 
the focus group discussion.  This paper examines participants‟ responses to the question 
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Focus group data were recorded and transcribed using conventional notation (ten Have, 
1999).  Email communication was copied to separate file, to ensure anonymity.  
Spelling and layout, however, were left unchanged. 
 
Participants 
The total number of stroke participants was 22 (12 in focus groups; 10 one-to-one 
emails), and in the focus groups there were 5 carers. 
 
Analytic procedure 





(1996).  First, transcripts were read through and inspected closely to identify 
recurrent patterns or features in the data.  Next, the analysis of these broadly-defined 
constructions was informed by what Edwards
 
(1997) refers to as the „could-have-been-
otherwise‟ quality of talk; every detail of what is said is treated as potentially significant 
because it was said in that way and at that particular time.  When it appeared that an 
utterance had a particular function – such as constructing identity in a certain manner – 
there followed an exploration of why the transcript was being read in such a way, and 
how this could be supported by what was in the text.  Analytic points are illustrated by 
direct quotations.     
 
Results and analysis  
In this section, we examine the ways in which participants oriented to identity issues in 
their responses to the question "in what ways has your illness affected you as a person?"  
Preliminary analyses showed that some respondents constructed themselves as having 
changed their outlook as a result of their stroke.  In several email accounts, these 
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changes were described as positive. These are examined in more detail in Section 1 
where we also address the issue of what is achieved through these communications.  In 
section 2, we examine extracts from the focus group discussions which display a rather 
different pattern. 
 
Section 1: Email Communication 
In the following extract, Ana describes the effect of having had a stroke as profound and 
she warrants this claim by producing examples of what has changed. 
 
 Extract 1 DSIPCp12 Ana 
   1  Having  had  a  stroke  has  affected  me  profoundly: 
   2 
   3 My  value  systems  have  altered  i.e. there  are  different  
   4 priorities I  consider  important. I  place  less  importance  on   
   5 ideas  of 'morality',  'goodness',  etc  and  more  on  the  basic   
   6 principle  that people  are  more  important  than  ideas.   
 
In particular, Ana claims that her “value systems have altered” (line 3), and that she 
now considers “different priorities” important.  Her use of the terms “value systems”, 
“priorities” and “basic principle” indicate the non-superficial nature of the change that 
stroke has brought about in her.  She also contrasts her current and former values.  
Specifically, she contrasts “ideas”, to which she now attaches less importance, with 
“people” to whom she now attaches more importance.  One interesting feature of this 
characterisation is that she works up a listing of examples of these ideas on which she 
places less importance: “ „morality‟ ”, “ „goodness‟, etc”.  These are aspects of human 
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experience that are normatively regarded as positive.  But this listing is developed in a 
particular way.  It is identified as a set of “ideas”, and the two specific examples that are 
offered are typographically represented through the use of inverted commas.  This 
conveys to the reader that „morality‟ and „goodness‟ are functioning as labels for these 
ideas, rather than the qualities themselves.  The implication here is not that Anna places 
less importance on whether people are moral or good but rather that she places less 
importance on abstract ideas of morality and goodness.  She contrasts “ideas” with “the 
basic principle” that “people are more important than ideas”, which constructs her as 
someone who cares more about others than about abstract notions.  Moreover, the level 
of the importance which people hold for Ana is emphasised by the positive nature of the 
abstract ideas she chooses to list.   
 
Slightly later in her email, Ana indicates other ways in which she has changed.  
 
 Extract 2 DSIPCp13 Ana 
 19 I  am  probably  less  tolerant  of  some  behaviours  e.g.   
 20 rudeness  and other  sorts  of  bad  manners,  dishonesty,  etc,   
 21 and  more  tolerant  of others  e.g.  eccentricity. 
 22 
 23 My  moods  can  be  changeable  and  I  can  be  irritable,  this   
 24 is noticeable  not  because  it's  necessarily  abnormal,  but   
 25 because  I  was so  calm  and  placid  before. 
 
Here, Ana produces a description of herself that might lead to the inference that stroke 
has had a negative effect on her.  She describes herself as “less tolerant”.  However, this 
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self-ascription is mitigated in several ways.  First, her expression of lack of tolerance is 
preceded by “probably less” which suggests room for doubt.  Second, her lack of 
tolerance is described in relation to specific behaviours rather than being, say, a general 
trait or one directed towards particular people. This specificity is reinforced by her 
claim that there are other behaviours of which she is more tolerant, such as eccentricity.  
Third, examples of behaviour of which she is less tolerant include “rudeness and other 
sorts of bad manners, dishonesty” (line 20).  A common-sense inference is that being 
less tolerant of such behaviours is not necessarily a negative aspect of the self; a 
reasonable person might be expected not to tolerate bad behaviours.   
 
In lines 23 to 25, Ana offers a third example of change: “my moods can be changeable 
and I can be irritable.”   But, as in her second example of change, this is moderated. By 
claiming that she “can” be irritable, Ana emphases the transitory nature of her emotional 
states.  At line 24, she makes relevant the question of whether her irritability is normal 
or not by suggesting, albeit in a qualified sense, that it is noticeable but not abnormal, 
and she accounts for this by providing a description of herself before her stroke as “so 
calm and placid.”  This establishes a version of herself with which her (sometimes) 
irritable self is contrasted, and accounts for the significance of being more irritable.   
 
In extracts 1 and 2, then, Ana produces three examples of ways she has changed. These 
include her value systems, tolerance of behaviours, and moods. It is noticeable that none 
of these refer to physical functioning, and that they are all presented in modified ways 
that imply that change is positive, balanced or moderate. Further moderating devices are 
used to achieve a similar effect in extract 3 below. 
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 Extract 3 DSIPCp12 Frederick  
   4 It has taken a big part away from me in terms of self realisation  
   5 (i.e. I won't be able to do what I wanted to achieve before and  
   6 I'm not even able to see myself the way I was before). This is  
   7 not self generated, but a reflection of how society looks at  
   8 disabled people. I don't fit the profile of any other group in the  
   9 hierarchy in our macho society.  Personally I find that I have  
 10 more time to reflect on life and spiritual values have overtaken  
 11 material ones. 
 
In contrast to Ana‟s account above, Frederick characterises the effect of stroke in terms 
of loss: “it has taken a big part away from me in terms of self realisation” (line 4).  He 
also specifies two ways in which self realisation has been prevented.  At line 5, he 
describes not being able to achieve what he wanted “before” (presumably prior to 
having a stroke).  He also writes “I‟m not even able to see myself the way I was before” 
(line 6).  These descriptions are precisely the kinds of account that would be expected 
from the literature, which claims that chronic illness produces a loss of self.  However, 
what is interesting here is the nature of the explanation he goes on to provide for this 
state of affairs. At lines 6 to 8, he claims that this is not “self generated” but “a 
reflection of how society looks at disabled people.”  In other words, he claims that self 
realisation is thwarted not because of some deficiency or fault of his own, but because 
of others‟ perceptions of disabled people in general, and society‟s pre-occupation with 
machismo. Moreover, he implies that he is ascribed membership (by others) of the 
category „disabled‟ because he does not fit any other profile. It is by default, then, rather 
than due to Frederick‟s physical functioning or abilities.  This depiction of society helps 
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to establish that the problematic nature of this stroke experience is grounded in external 
factors, rather than in personal responsibility.  
 
Frederick then produces an account of his personal views of how stroke has affected 
him.  Specifically, he describes two changes: having more time to reflect on life, and 
“spiritual values” having become more important, in that they have “overtaken” 
material values.  This description is worked up as a factual account by describing it as a 
“find” that he has made.  It is also noteworthy that, at line 9, Frederick stresses the 
relevance of this outcome to himself by emphasising that it is something he has 
“personally” found, thereby implicitly contrasting it with the perceptions of himself 
which are not “self generated” but which are merely reflections of how society sees 
disabled people. 
 
In the final extract we examine, Barry claims explicitly that stroke has changed him “for 
the better” and he produces a list of ways in which he has changed. 
 
 Extract 4 DSIPCp12 Barry 
   1 I think my haemorrhage has changed me for the better. 
   2 
   3 After the actuall seriousness of my illness had sunk in, I  
   4 decided not to take things for granted again.  My friends, family  
   5 all rallied round to help me recover, so I am forever in their  
   6 debt. 
   7 
   8 I learned that you can't let little things in life get you down, and  
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   9 that every day is  a new experience.  My mother gets upset if the  
 10 car breaks down for example, and she has to walk to work.   
 11 Whereas I would look at it as "thank goodness the car broke  
 12 down at home, and not out in a lonely place late at night".  I  
 13 know thats a wierd example, but I look at the best in each  
 14 situation.   I take each day at a time, I don't get stressed out as  
 15 much.  I always try and smile, no matter how hopeless the  
 16 situation.  I think "if I didn't laugh about it and smile and be  
 17 kind to others - I'd go mad!"  Its certainly better than feeling  
 18 sorry for myself and shut myself away, a sad fact that a lot of  
 19 stroke sufferers do. 
 
First, at lines 3 and 4, Barry describes himself as not taking “things for granted again.” 
He warrants this by claiming “my friends, family all rallied round to help me recover” 
and his consequent reaction “so I am forever in their debt”.  The implication is that in 
the past he might have taken others‟ support for granted, whereas he will never do so 
again.  Insofar as taking others for granted is not generally regarded as a positive way of 
relating to others, it can be inferred that Barry‟s new attitude is a change for the better. 
Barry‟s more positive relations with others are further emphasised towards the end of 
his account where he describes himself as being “kind to others” (line 17). 
 
Second, Barry claims “I learned that you can‟t let little things in life get you down” (line 
8), and in lines 13-14 he further stresses his optimistic attitude towards potentially 
stressful situations (“I look at the best in each situation”).  This contrast is developed by 
means of a hypothetical case that Barry explicitly identifies as an example.  At lines 9 to 
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13, Barry provides an account of the difference between the way his mother would 
respond (by getting upset at the inconvenience) and the way he would respond to a 
problematic event (a car breaking down).  In this account, Barry characterises himself as 
someone who would identify the positive features of the situation through contrast with 
what could have been otherwise (e.g. the car breaking down at home rather than in a 
lonely place, before work rather than late at night).  The vividness of this example is 
emphasised by Barry‟s use of a reported speech marks, which implies that he is 
reporting actual thoughts.  Thus, he presents his hypothetical response to the 
problematic event as though it had occurred.  At lines 12 and 13, Barry orients to his 
own example of the car breaking down as though it is in some way problematic – “I 
know that‟s a weird example.”   Barry can thus be heard as acknowledging that this may 
be open to challenge.  Immediately afterwards, though, he introduces a gloss in highly 
positive terms, “I look at the best in each situation” (lines 13 and 14) by means of the 
disjunction “but”.  In doing so, Barry orients to his own example as potentially 
problematic, and at the same time establishes that it is merely an example of his own 
positive outlook.   
 
Third, at lines 14 to 17, Barry provides a list of other ways in which he looks “at the 
best” :  taking each day as it comes, not getting so stressed, trying to smile whatever the 
circumstances, and not feeling sorry for himself.  
 
In this account, the positively evaluated nature of Barry‟s current state is portrayed as an 
outcome of Barry‟s own efforts.  This is accomplished by a switch from the passive 
voice (“has changed me”, “had sunk in” in lines 1 and 3) to a series of first person 
singular active voicings.  For example, at lines 3 and 4, not taking things for granted any 
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more is described as an outcome of his own decision (“I decided …”), while at line 8 
his positive attitude towards potentially stressful situations is described as something he 
has learned.  At lines 11 and 13 (“I would look at”; “I look at”), he uses the active voice 
to suggest that he would view a problematic event more positively than his mother.  
This same device appears at a number of other points in lines 14 to 17.  Especially 
noteworthy is his description of his own cognitive state of thinking at lines 16 and 17 
(“I think “If I didn‟t laugh about it and smile and be kind to others – I‟d go mad!” ”).  
This reported speech formulation is designed to function as a report on an interior 
monologue, thereby emphasising that his positive outlook is a consequence of conscious 
and deliberate thought processes.   
 
In a number of ways, Barry implies that his current situation is one that some people 
would find hard to deal with.  For example, he describes himself as “trying to smile” 
which makes available the inference that his situation is one in which smiling may be 
difficult.  This is given further emphasis by his acknowledgment that at least some 
situations he finds himself in might be classified as “hopeless”.  The seriousness of his 
situation is further identified through his use at lines 16 and 17 of an „if … then‟ 
construction (Potter, 1996).   If it were not for his laughter, smiles and kindness, the 
situation would be one that might affect his mental health.  Barry‟s own case is then 
contrasted with that of members of the category “stroke sufferers” who are depicted as 
not coping as well with these difficulties.  Instead, this category of people is associated 
with the “sad fact” of feeling sorry for themselves and shutting themselves away.  In 
this respect, it is interesting to note that Barry avoids attributing to himself the 
categorisation “stroke sufferer” opting instead for the slightly unusual phrasing of “my 
haemorrhage” and “my illness”   
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In accounting for change, the account-giver is faced with certain interactionally 
sensitive issues.  On the one hand, participants can be expected to display some 
sensitivity to the issue of having acquired a „damaged‟ identity or sense of self as a 
result of their illness.  In all three cases above, Ana, Frederick and Barry attend to issues 
of accountability.  On the one hand, they display sensitivity about a potentially 
„damaged‟ sense of self by highlighting positive features of their experiences.  On the 
other hand, participants are also likely to attend to the interactional context in which 
these accounts are developed – one in which they are being asked to provide accounts of 
their own illness.  Here, then, respondents present less positive elements of their 
experience as stroke sufferers but they do so in such as way as to minimise their 
negativity or to play down any personal responsibility for those negative outcomes.  
Thus Ana works up her own irritability as noticeable only in contrast to her former self.  
Frederick describes his inability to achieve his desires as located externally, in societal 
views, rather than as deriving from himself.  In contrast, Barry reports the more positive 
aspects of his experience largely in terms of his own efforts and responsibility. 
 
 
Section 2: Focus group interactions 
In this section, we turn to interactions that arose during focus group discussions in 
which the participants were co-present.  In the following extracts, the participants 
included both stroke sufferers and some of their carers.  The names of carers are 
represented in italic font, and the interviewer‟s name is underlined. Two features 
distinguish these interactions from the email communications analysed above.  The first 
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is that focus group discussion allows for the sequential unfolding of accounts across 
conversational turns.  So focus group discussion makes sufferers‟ accounts immediately 
available for challenge by carers in a conversational next turn.  This differs from the 
email context described in section 1, where claims that are made are practically 
unavailable for immediate challenge.  In the extracts that follow it can be seen that 
sufferers‟ claims are open to question within the focus group format.  The second 
feature of everyday conversations that arises in these discussions is that the interactional 
setting allows carers to initiate accounts.  And, as is the case in everyday conversation, 
sufferers can be seen to orient to these carers‟ accounts in their subsequent 
contributions. 
 
In the following extract, a stroke sufferer, Eric, produces an account of how he changed 
as a result of stroke that is then challenged by one of the carers present, Alison.  
 
 Extract 5 FGDS2 
584 Eric:    but I would have taken the view .hh before the stroke that 
585   I could have run this hospital you know .h I could have  
586 been the .h the (1.0) manager of the place you know but  
587   eh .hh now I just [blows out 'pwrr'] couldn't care less  
 588 Jennifer:   mhmm 
 589 Alison:   [that's not true that's not true to say you couldn't care  
 590   less 
 591 Euan:   [I could still I could still do I could still but I keep falling  
 592   asleep [[laughs 
 593 Eric:              [[laughs 
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 594 Alison:   because you could care less and that's what's bugs you= 
 595 Eric:    that's the frustration yeah 
 
Earlier in the discussion, Alison and Lorna (respectively, carers of Eric and Euan) had 
been talking about what Eric was like before and after his stroke in terms of his belief in 
himself as strong and invincible.   
 
At the start of this extract, Eric describes how he has changed, and in lines 584-587, he 
uses a contrast formulation to construct the extent to which he has changed as a result of 
his stroke.  He claims that, whereas before his stroke he would have taken the view that 
he could have run the hospital (in which the focus group was held), now he couldn't care 
less.  With this claim, he constructs the change as one of motivation rather than, say, 
inability.  At lines 591-592, Euan adopts an affiliative stance, affirming that he could 
still perform roles of this sort.  He incorporates into his turn a reference to his present 
incapacities by referring to his tendency to fall asleep.  However, both he and Eric 
orient to this as a non-serious or humorous claim.  So both Eric‟s and Euan‟s claims are 
carefully designed to deal with the delicate interactional problem of accounting for the 
changes stroke has brought about, while lessening the negative impact on identity 
associated with loss of ability. 
 
In her next turn, Alison directly challenges Eric‟s description of his current self as 
lacking motivation, through the repeated phrase “that‟s not true that‟s not true.”  She 
claims, by contrast, that he does care and she produces evidence of the extent to which 
he cares through her reference to this as something that “bugs” Eric.  The implication is 
that it is not motivation but ability that prevents Eric from achieving what he would 
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have before the stroke.  At line 595, Eric appears to accept this alternative account by 
stating that his current state of affairs is associated with frustration.  That is, Eric's 
response to Alison‟s challenge is not to defend his earlier claim, but rather to agree with 
her.  Thus, he seems to contradict what he has just said.  This apparent contradiction can 
be explained if we consider the actions that are being performed in each turn.  When 
Alison challenges Eric‟s claim, she ignores any inference that Eric might still be capable 
of running the hospital, and orients instead to the potentially damaging implication that 
he lacks motivation.  Thus, for Eric to agree with her construction at this point is for 
him to maintain a positive identity.   
 
The „conversational‟ setting of focus group discussion, then, affords carers the 
opportunity of challenging sufferers‟ accounts.  However, it also provides them with 
interactional slots where they can develop their own accounts.  This is demonstrated in 
the following extract, which arises following a discussion about how tired the stroke 
sufferers become as a result of their illness. 
 
Extract 6 FGDS2 
636 Lorna:  but you‟ve (1.0) dropped lots of things that you used to 
637   do as well 
638 Euan:  mhmm 
639 Lorna:  you would do it I think if you were asked (1.0) like (1.0) 
640   do that extra wee bit of (1.0) tidying up in the garden that 
641   you might have done voluntarily before (2.0) You j- the 
642   whether that‟s energy or just (2.0) whatever you just don‟t 
643   do it now 
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644 Sharon: mm 
645 Eric:  I think it‟s a bit of both really 
646 Lorna:  yeah 
647 Eric:  I think it‟s (1.0) energy 
648 Alison:  I mean Eric will say I‟ll ask him the the the same thing 
649   yeah “I‟ll do that for you” [but it doesnae happen 
650 Euan:                      [I always get ideas of things I 
651   want to be doing but (2.0) never get them done 
652 Eric:  energy and motivation [yeah 
653 Lorna:      [mhmm 
654 Alison:   yeah I've wondered about that as well whether that's (1.0)  
655   the stroke or whether it's just that they have well (1.0) it  
656   doesnae [doesn't] (1.0) I cannae [can't] be bothered you  
657   know whether it's (1.0) being lazy or whether it's (1.0) the 
658   stroke 
 
In this extract, Lorna describes Euan as no longer carrying out tasks he voluntarily 
performed before his stroke.  However, she indicates in her next turn that Euan is 
capable of performing these tasks in that he would carry them out if asked.  At lines 
642-643 she then offers up two candidate explanations for this state of affairs: “energy” 
or “you just don‟t do it now”.  The first explanation draws upon the common sense idea 
that ill people might not have the same energy levels as healthy people.  This provides 
an explanation for Euan not performing tasks he formerly carried out.  However, Lorna 
then offers a second potential explanation, “just not doing” something. Presented in 
contrast to lacking energy, this may implicate laziness, lack of motivation or apathy and 
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indeed, there is evidence later in the extract that this is how it is taken (“energy and 
motivation”, line 652; and a result of stroke or “being lazy”, line 657). Moreover, not 
doing something because of a lack of motivation or laziness is problematic in contrast to 
not doing it because of a lack of energy (resulting from) the stroke.  It is also worth 
noting that whereas Lorna‟s reference is to Euan specifically, Alison claims that Eric 
displays similar behaviour (thereby implying that this may be a feature of stroke 
sufferers in general).  She also upgrades Lorna‟s complaint about having to ask Euan to 
do tasks, claiming that Eric will agree to do something but “it doesnae happen.” 
 
In the conversational turns between Lorna and Alison‟s accounts, Euan and Eric address 
the relevance to them of these potential explanations.  At line 645, Eric does agreement 
with Lorna‟s assessment in attributing not doing tasks to both “energy and motivation” 
in saying “I think it‟s a bit of both really” (645).   At line 651, Eric seems to orient to 
Alison‟s prior turn as indicating that his reference to “energy” is insufficient as an 
explanation by amending his claim to include both energy and motivation.   
 
In the following extract, which immediately follows on from the previous extract, Eric 
can be seen to address Alison‟s implicit criticism that he is lazy by providing an 
extended description of how illness affects people in a way that could be interpreted as 
laziness. 
 
 Extract 7 FGDS1 
 659 Jennifer: mhmm 
660 Alison:  [it's sometimes like that 
 661 Eric:    [it's very easy (1.0) eh I can understand how people who  
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 662   have got eh .hh hip problems or whatever back problems  
 663   whatever .hh they just sit because it's it's very easy just  
 664   to sit there and just say .hh "ah it's too much effort" .h 
 665   you know 
 
Eric's turn begins “it's very easy” (line 661), then, rather than saying immediately what 
it is that is very easy, he inserts a claim - that he understands how other people “just sit” 
because it is too much effort to do otherwise.  This claim provides an indirect means of 
countering Alison's challenge.  It does this in three ways.  First, by claiming to 
understand these other people, we might infer that his problem is similar to theirs; that 
is, difficulties with mobility.  Second, Eric's understanding can be contrasted with 
Alison's failure to work out what is going on.  Third, he provides a warrant for the 
behaviour of these other people.  That is, they may “just sit”, but they are identified as 
having good reason to be immobile - hip and back problems.  The indirect nature of 
Eric's response to Alison's challenge is what renders it rhetorically powerful.  He does 
not provide a straightforward account that would give an indication of how much of his 
inability might or might not be attributable to stroke, and instead makes a claim that 
would be hard for Alison to counter.  His “understanding” is an internal event, therefore 
difficult to refute.  He refers to a hypothetical group of people, and therefore his attitude 
towards them could not easily be challenged on the basis of actual behaviour.  
Furthermore, the attributes of the group to which he refers provide a reasonable warrant 
for their behaviour.   
 
What the preceding extracts have demonstrated, then, is that when sufferers produce 
accounts, carers may challenge those accounts. Carers may also introduce their own 
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accounts to which sufferers, in turn, must orient in their subsequent contributions. 
Because of this, sufferers display an ongoing sensitivity to the interactional 
consequences that arise out of the different participatory roles which they and their 
carers inhabit during these discussions.   
 
 Extract 8 FGDS1 
 853 Jennifer: can anybody say in what in (1.0) what wa:ys would you 
 854   say that having had a stroke has affected you as a  
 855   person? 
  856   (3.0) 
 857 Yvonne: impatient (1.0) e:h 
 858 Jennifer: what make it has made you impatient 
 859 Yvonne: mhmm 
 860 Jennifer: yeah? 
 861 Yvonne: [very quietly] aye  
862   (3.0) 
 863 Norman: yeah it's [unclear] 
 864 Ian:  it's maybe 
 865 Norman: one of the things that trauma and shock bring on 
 866 Ian:  yeah maybe you should ask the carers rather than the .h 
 867   the sufferers of that [laughs] 
 868 Yvonne: that's right 
 
There are several features of Yvonne‟s response to this question which are worth noting.  
First, there is a lengthy pause of three seconds after the initial question which indicates 
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that the issue of post-stroke change is a difficult one for the focus group members 
(participants were generally fluent speakers; analysis of the full transcript shows very 
few pauses of this length).  Jefferson (1989) suggests that a silence of this length may 
indicate that what has been said is problematic, or that providing a response is 
problematic.  Second,  when Yvonne does reply, she provides a relatively minimal 
response, “impatient” which is not directly attributed to, say, her own behaviour or 
feelings. Thus, the interviewer produces a question seeking clarification, “it has made 
you impatient” which in turn indicates that she interprets this as a reference to a 
psychological state or trait.  The focus group moderator‟s questions at lines 858 and 860 
therefore open up a slot for Yvonne to expand on this change but Yvonne again 
produces a minimal turn, with her second reply being voiced in quiet tones.  So 
although Yvonne provides conversationally appropriate responses, in that she provides 
answers to the moderator‟s questions, she avoids producing further description of the 
relationship between her stroke and impatience. This is left to the other participants. 
 
After a further lengthy pause, Norman produces an agreement at line 863.  In the 
subsequent turns, Norman, Ian and Yvonne then jointly work up an explanatory account 
that offers justification for stroke sufferers being impatient while, at the same time, 
attending to the interactional sensitivity of this admission within the particular context.  
One feature of this account is that Norman provides an impersonal explanation, saying 
that impatience is “brought on” by “trauma” and “shock”.  The use of these terms helps 
to establish the sufferer‟s impatience as a rational response to a serious personal event.  
So although impatience is a negative feature of someone‟s psychological state, the 
stroke sufferer‟s personal responsibility for being impatient is minimised.  It is 
noteworthy that Norman frames impatience as only “one of the things” that may result 
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from the trauma and shock of stroke.  This might make a listing of further negative 
aspects appropriate as a continuation of his turn.  However, at this point Ian says 
“maybe you should ask the carers rather than the .h sufferers”, thereby indicating that 
carers are in a better position to assess the consequences of stroke than sufferers are.  At 
the same time, Ian displays that his comment is intended to be humorous, indexing it 
with laughter at line 867.  This switch to a more humorous tone works to indicate that 
the potential difficulties associated with stroke sufferers becoming impatient may not be 
as serious as could otherwise be imagined.  At the same time he offers the 
conversational floor to the carers who are present.  This explicit reference to carers 
allows Ian to acknowledge that the issue of sufferers being impatient is one that is 
relevant to their carers.   
 
Summary 
In focus group discussions, then, the role of carer provides these participants with the 
rights and entitlements to criticise sufferers‟ accounts and to put forward their own 
alternative, potentially negative accounts as reformulations of or as counter-arguments 
to the sufferers‟ accounts.  In this way, sufferers‟ evaluations of the life consequences of 
experiencing stroke are open to immediate challenge by those carers whose lives have 
also been seriously affected.  In addition, carers are able to initiate their own descriptive 
accounts that highlight negative aspects of the stroke sufferer that have arisen as a result 
of experiencing a stroke.   
 
In producing their own accounts, stroke sufferers display sensitivity to this interactional 
issue.  In particular, it is noteworthy that the accounts of focus group participants differ 
from those of email participants in that they did not provide explicitly positive 
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evaluations of the impact which stroke has had on their lives. Both email and, focus 
group participants oriented to stroke as a serious life event. And in describing the effects 
of stroke, they work to minimise potential negative inferences about themselves arising 
out of their experience of stroke.  However, unlike the email participants, the focus 
group stroke sufferers displayed sensitivity to the issue of how their mitigation of the 
negative aspects of stroke would be received and dealt with by those carers who were 
co-present.  So, although there are similarities between the sufferer‟s accounts produced 




The approach taken in this study is that accounts describing illness might fruitfully be 
examined for their rhetorical function.  At the beginning of this paper, we noted that 
stroke sufferers‟ accounts of their experience of illness were likely to represent both 
positive and negative aspects of stroke. The extracts examined here show that 
participants sometimes display sensitivity to the issue of having acquired a „damaged‟ 
identity as a result of their illness.  However, they do so in a way that allows them to 
emphasise positive aspects of their experience that have in some way improved their 
lives.  At the same time, participants can be seen to attend to the issue of whether the 
accounts they develop are persuasive or believable.  Their accounts are designed so that 
they are not heard as inappropriately positive about their experiences of suffering from a 
traumatic illness.  Among the email participants, the more negative elements of their 
experience as stroke sufferers are reproduced in accounts so as to minimise any personal 
responsibility for those negative outcomes.  More positive aspects of this experience, by 
contrast, are depicted largely in terms of the participants‟ own efforts and responsibility. 
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The focus group participants also oriented to stroke as a serious life event.  But like the 
email participants, focus group sufferers described their experiences in a way that 
minimised the potentially negative inferences that others might make about them as 
stroke sufferers.  
 
However although there are similarities between the sufferer‟s accounts produced in the 
email context and in the focus-group context, there are also important differences.  
Focus group stroke sufferers, unlike email participants, did not produce highly positive 
evaluations of their experience.  Moreover, they displayed sensitivity to the way that 
carers would respond to mitigation of the negative aspects of stroke. It seems that in 
part this difference arises out of the difference in interactional contexts.  In focus group 
discussions, carers were able to criticise sufferers‟ accounts and were also able to 
generate their own, potentially negative accounts.  In their contributions to the 
discussion, sufferers oriented to these actual or potential criticisms in the way that they 
designed their claims.  This provides an important demonstration of the context-
dependent nature of identity-constructions, and of the ways in which carers play a role 
in maintaining damaged identities.   
 
In this research, participants who had suffered stroke did not talk or write about a 
disrupted self, as discussed by Ellis-Hill, Payne & Ward  (2000).  They did, however, 
work to construct a positive identity.  That they did this allows us to infer that there is 
indeed some stigma surrounding stroke.  Our findings also elaborate previous research 
that indicates the importance of identity to stroke sufferers (Clarke & Black, 2003; 
Shadden, 2005; Shadden & Agan, 2004), and in particular how it can be influenced in 
interactions with others.   
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White & Johnstone (2000)  suggest that stroke sufferers can be held accountable for 
their recovery.  We have shown how participants in focus groups, whose carers were co-
present, showed particular sensitivity to the identity implications of their talk.  Stroke 
rehabilitation is characterised by its focus on regaining physical function – an emphasis 
that has been criticised because it fails to take enough account of the interests and 
experiences of the sufferer (Kirkevold, 2002).  This study suggests that people who 
have suffered stroke do orient to the difficulty in maintaining a positive sense of self, 
particularly in the presence of their carers.   It also demonstrates the value of a 
qualitative approach to studying the experience of living with a stroke, and in particular 
the usefulness of discourse analytic methods. 
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